Beyond the Security Hub CSPM score
AWS Cloud Security
Assessment
We read your AWS Organization the way an attacker would: IAM policies and trust relationships, S3 bucket exposure, service control policies, and whether GuardDuty and CloudTrail would catch an attack in progress. Findings map to the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark, and each one is confirmed by hand.
Account by account
The AWS settings
behind real breaches.
We use a read only audit role in each account and score against the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark and the AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar. Prowler and IAM Access Analyzer surface candidates. We then trace findings by hand to show which ones chain into account takeover.
What we examine
IAM
Trace every path to AdministratorAccess.
Users, roles and policies that can escalate to admin, with the exact chain for each.
- Role trust policies checked for overly broad principals and external accounts.
- Escalation paths such as iam:PassRole and policy version abuse tested.
- Long lived IAM user credentials and unused roles listed for removal.
S3 & data
Find the bucket that should never have been public.
Every bucket, snapshot and AMI shared beyond your Organization, with a note of what it holds.
- S3 Block Public Access checked at the account and bucket level.
- Bucket policies and ACLs read for anonymous and cross account access.
- Public EBS and RDS snapshots and shared AMIs found.
Organizations & SCPs
Test the guardrails that sit above every account.
Which service control policies actually stop risky actions, and which accounts sit outside them.
- Organizational unit structure and use of the management account reviewed.
- SCPs read for gaps such as disabling CloudTrail or leaving the Organization.
- Root user protection and MFA checked in every member account.
Detection
Check that GuardDuty and CloudTrail would see it.
Logging and detection coverage by account and region, with the attacker actions that would go unseen.
- CloudTrail organization trail, log file validation and log bucket protection reviewed.
- GuardDuty enablement and finding routing checked in every region.
- Security Hub CSPM and AWS Config coverage compared to what your team believes is on.
Network
Map what the internet can reach in your VPCs.
Exposed services by account, with the security groups and routes that make them reachable.
- Security groups and network ACLs read for open management ports.
- Internet gateways, load balancers and public IPs inventoried.
- IMDSv2 enforcement checked on EC2 instances.
Workloads & secrets
Look for credentials left where attackers search first.
Secrets exposed in Lambda variables, user data, templates or code, each with a rotation plan.
- Lambda environment variables and EC2 user data checked for secrets.
- Secrets Manager and KMS policies reviewed for who can read and decrypt.
- CloudFormation and Terraform reviewed for the same flaws found live.
Key benefits
Close the AWS gaps that lead to breaches.
A wildcard policy matters when it connects a developer role to production data. We draw that chain, so your team sees why a finding ranks high instead of trusting a checker's color.
Every finding cites the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark control it fails, so evidence for SOC 2, ISO/IEC 27001 or a customer questionnaire comes straight from the report.
Your IAM policies, read by someone who writes them. You get a short list of roles to cut back and the policy changes to make, written so engineers can apply them directly.
What you get
What lands on
your desk.
Everything is written for AWS teams: resource ARNs, policy references and fixes your engineers can apply.
The document
The AWS assessment report
Executive summary, accounts in scope, CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark results, escalation chains drawn out, and each confirmed finding with evidence, affected ARNs and the policy or setting that fixes it.
The working file
The AWS findings tracker
One row per finding: account, region, resource ARN, benchmark control, severity, owner and status. Ready to load into Jira or whichever ticketing system your engineers already use.
The conversation
The AWS readout
A session with your cloud and platform engineers. We walk the escalation chains, agree which SCPs to add first, and answer questions about each fix while the reviewer is in the room.
Client case studies
Real engagements.
Documented outcomes.
In their words
"ForgePath has become a trusted security partner for YHB. Their team understands how a CPA firm operates and has helped us build a security program that’s both practical and sustainable."
In their words
"ForgePath has become a trusted security partner for YHB. Beyond helping us comply with FTC Safeguards requirements, they provide the governance, oversight, and guidance we rely on to protect our firm and our clients’ data. Their team understands how a CPA firm operates and has helped us build a security program that’s both practical and sustainable."
Trusted by industry leaders.
AWS specifics
Asked by
AWS teams.
Straight answers from the practitioners who do the work. If yours is not here, ask us directly.
A read only role in each account, deployed through a CloudFormation StackSet from your management account. It uses the AWS managed SecurityAudit and ViewOnlyAccess policies, so we cannot create, change or delete anything.
Security Hub CSPM reports failed controls one at a time. It does not tell you that three medium findings together let a developer role reach production data. We read the results in context, confirm them, and rank by real exposure.
Yes, if you want it in scope. Reviewing infrastructure as code alongside the live accounts shows whether a fix will survive the next deployment, or whether the template will put the problem straight back.
The report documents an independent configuration review with dated evidence and benchmark references, which auditors can use as supporting evidence. It is not a penetration test, so if your standard requires one, we scope that separately.
Ready?
Bring us
the problem.
One conversation with a senior practitioner who has carried this responsibility before. We will tell you what we would do, and whether it is us.








